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 Not long ago, the internet was a massless void – a cyberspace of untapped potential.  At a 
time when innovators were creating the “lunar modules” of internet exploration, Congress 
established the Communications Decency Act (CDA) with the hope of encouraging the growth 
and development of this budding technology.  A mere thirteen years later, we are now 
comfortably living in the deepest realms of cyberspace.  No longer is this idea the core of our 
wildest dreams; it is the center of our lives.  The only aspect yet unchanged are our laws, namely 
the CDA, which, despite its innocent beginnings, has developed into a rogue law, safeguarding 
the very entrepreneurs that threaten the health and prosperity of our brave, new, blogging world.  
It is time for a change. 
 Understanding the CDA first requires one to travel back in time to an age when 
cyberspace travel was still just a dream to most individuals.  In 1991, CompuServe, Inc. was on 
the forefront of this new technology, providing subscribers with access to “thousands of 
information sources” for a small, online service fee.
1
  Admittance to CompuServe’s “electronic 
library” allowed subscribers to “obtain access to over 150 special interest ‘forums,’ which [were] 
comprised of electronic bulletin boards, interactive online conferences, and topical databases.”
2
  
CompuServe, Inc. contracted with Cameron Communications, Inc. (CCI) to manage, regulate, 
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and control the contents of one such topical database known as “Journalism Forums.”
3
  Among 
the forums controlled by CCI was “Rumorville,” a “daily newsletter that provide[d] reports about 
broadcast journalism and journalists.”
4
   
Cubby, Inc. was created to attract the crowds that flocked to Rumorville on a daily basis.  
Competition in this new market was not well received by CompuServe.  In 1990, Cubby, Inc. 
brought suit against CompuServe for their publishing of false and defamatory statements within 
the Rumorville forum.
5
  The district court in Cubby adopted a traditional analysis of media 
defamation, finding CompuServe to be “the functional equivalent of a more traditional news 
vendor,” such as a bookstore or library.
6
  Because Cubby did not “set forth any specific facts 
showing that . . . CompuServe knew or had reason to know of Rumorville's contents,” 
CompuServe, as mere distributor of news, was not held liable for such publications.
7
  “The 
requirement that a distributor must have knowledge of the contents of a publication before 
liability can be imposed for distributing that publication is deeply rooted in the First 
Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.”
8
  However, the 
court noted that “[t]echnology is rapidly transforming the information industry,” seeming to 
forecast the changes that were soon to come.
9
      
 Four years later, a New York Supreme Court opinion provided the catalyst for that 
change, ultimately leading to Congress’s creation of the Communication Decency Act.  In 1995, 
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 3 
PRODIGY Services Corporation provided internet services to roughly two million subscribers.
10
  
Similar to CompuServe, PRODIGY offered numerous “bulletin boards” where individuals could 
post messages.
11
  One such board, “Money Talk,” was referred to as “the leading and most 
widely read financial computer bulletin board in the United States . . . .”
12
  In Stratton Oakmont, 
Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., Plaintiff filed suit against PRODIGY for libelous statements posted 
on this bulletin board by an unidentified user.
13
  PRODIGY relied on the court’s decision in 
Cubby as their defense, urging that, as distributor, they should not be held liable for the unknown 
actions of a third party.
14
  The court, however, distinguished this case from Cubby.  Unlike the 
previous case, PRODIGY retained full control of the bulletin board,
 
thus transforming their 
status from distributor to publisher.
15
  As a result, PRODIGY was held liable for the defamatory 
statements posted on their forum.
16
   
Let it be clear that this Court is in full agreement with Cubby. . . .  Computer 
bulletin boards should generally be regarded in the same context as bookstores, 
libraries and network affiliates . . . .  PRODIGY’s conscious choice, to gain the 
benefits of editorial control, has opened it up to a greater liability than 
CompuServe and other computer networks that make no such choice.
17
   
 
As a result of the court’s decision in Stratton Oakmont, internet providers that exercised control 
over the content of their website were considered a publisher under the law, thereby opening 
themselves to potential liability for defamatory statements posted by a third party. 
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 Congress created the CDA to “remove the disincentives to selfregulation created by the 
Stratton Oakmont decision.”
18
  Growth of the internet was simply too important.  As stated, “the 
rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive computer services available to 
individual Americans represent[ed] an extraordinary advance in the availability of educational 
and informational resources to our citizens.”
19
  Specifically, the “political, educational, cultural, 
and entertainment services” made available through the internet were identified as the core of its 
intrinsic value – ideas believed to merit the extension of Government’s protective hand.
20
   
Congress noted multiple policy reasons for enacting the CDA: 
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive 
computer services and other interactive media; (2) to preserve the vibrant and 
competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive 
computer service, unfettered by Federal or State regulation; (3) to encourage the 
development of technologies which maximize user control over what information 
is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other 
interactive computer services; (4) to remove disincentives for the development 
and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to 
restrict their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online material; 
and (5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and 
punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer.
21
         
 
Most importantly for this particular thesis, Congress responded to the Oakmont Stratton 
decision by creating a “good samaritan” provision for the “blocking and screening of offensive 
material”
22
 by an interactive computer service: “No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.”
23
  Congress further provided extensive immunity to internet 
computer services in the realm of civil liability by including: 
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 5 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on 
account of – (A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or 
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, 
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, 
whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or (B) any action taken 
to enable or make available to information content providers or others the 
technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1).
24
 
By doing so, Congress ensured that responsible managers could monitor and control their 
website’s content without availing themselves to the typical liability facing media publishers.   
 Courts have generally regarded Congress’s intent in creating the CDA to reflect two 
fundamental purposes: “to maintain the robust nature of Internet communication and, 
accordingly, to keep government interference in the medium to a minimum” by encouraging self-
regulation of internet service providers.
25
  Despite recognition of these two legislative ideals, 
court interpretations of the CDA have ironically led to a fundamental departure from the law’s 
original purpose. 
 The landmark case regarding the CDA came shortly after the statute’s conception by the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Zeran v. America Online, Inc.
26
  In Zeran, Petitioner sued the 
online giant for failure to timely remove defamatory statements posted by an unidentified third 
party from its message boards.
27
  The day after the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal 
Building in Oklahoma City, a message was posted on AOL advertising “Naughty Oklahoma T-
Shirts” that featured “offensive and tasteless slogans” related to the bombing.
28
  Interested buyers 
were told to contact “Ken” at Zeran’s home phone number in Seattle, Washington.
29
  The 
                                                 
24
 Id. § 230(c)(2). 
25
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 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. 
28





ensuing days were filled with thousands of angry phone calls and death threats.
30
  Zeran 
contacted AOL multiple times and was assured with each call that the posted messages would 
soon be deleted.
31
  Unfortunately, over next few days, not only did the original messages remain, 
but additional posts were added.
32
  “By April 30, Zeran was receiving an abusive phone call 
approximately every two minutes.”
33
  Not until May 14 did “the number of calls to Zeran’s 
residence finally subside[] to fifteen per day.”
34
  Petitioner urged that, despite repeated requests, 
AOL never removed the baseless messages posted on its website.
35
 
 AOL immediately went to the CDA as an affirmative defense, urging immunity under § 
230(c)(1).
36
  The district court granted AOL’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, dismissing 
the suit based on CDA protection.
37
  On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the court affirmed the 
lower court’s decision, noting the broad immunity the CDA provides to internet service 
providers.
38
  “The purpose of this statutory immunity is not difficult to discern.  Congress 
recognized the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to freedom of speech in the new and 
burgeoning Internet medium.”
39
  Therefore, the court adopted a pragmatic approach to protecting 
the growth and development of the internet by extending open-ended immunity to internet 
service providers for otherwise impermissible conduct occurring within their electronic pages. 
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 7 
In its opinion, the court further clarified the distinction between publisher and distributor 
created as a result of the CDA.
40
  Zeran had relied on Oakmont Stratton throughout his 
complaint, urging the court to apply distributor liability as a result of AOL’s notice of the 
defamatory statements.
41
  Because AOL was a distributor, similar to Oakmont Stratton, Zeran 
asserted that their knowledge of the defamatory statements and subsequent failure to act carried 
with it a certain degree of liability.
42
  The court rejected the distinction between publisher and 
distributor as applied to the CDA.
43
  Rather, the court declared that “AOL falls squarely within 
this traditional definition of a publisher and, therefore, is clearly protected by § 230’s 
immunity.”
44
  “The simple fact of notice surely cannot transform one from an original publisher 
to a distributor in the eyes of the law.”
45
  Despite the court’s clear recognition of AOL’s 
distributor status, they held the website’s additional status as publisher trumped any potential 
notice liability claim as a result of the broad immunity provided within the CDA.
46
   
Undoubtedly, the CDA was created for noble purposes.  “Without the immunity provided 
in Section 230(c), users and providers of interactive computer services who review material 
could be found liable for the statements of third parties, yet providers and users that disavow any 
responsibility would be free from liability.”
47
  The court’s interpretation of the CDA, however, 
turned the traditional approach to media defamation on its heels.  Publishers in cyberspace are 
now blanketed with immunity rather than considered wholly liable for published defamation.  In 
                                                 
40
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 8 
addition, any potential liability for their conduct as distributor is dismissed as irrelevant.  As a 
result, otherwise unlawful actions committed in the world of cyberspace are largely condoned. 
And the irony resulting from Zeran does not end here.  As mentioned earlier, the CDA 
was enacted to protect individuals who chose to remove potentially dangerous items from their 
websites – to encourage internet service providers to take action for the purpose of protecting the 
integrity and morality of cyberspace.  Zeran produces an opposite result, immunizing providers 
for inaction at the expense of innocent members of society defamed by unknown third parties. 
Courts have continued to perpetuate the Zeran approach by applying broad immunity to 
internet service providers for unlawful acts occurring within their domain.  In the recent case of 
Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, a local housing council 
brought suit against the website for allegedly violating the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and local 
housing laws.
48
  Roommate.com required within its roommate-compatibility questionnaire 
impermissible information regarding the subscriber’s “sex, family status, and sexual 
orientation.”
49
  The Ninth Circuit first concluded that CDA immunity was not extended to acts in 
violation of federal or state law.
50
  “The Communications Decency Act was not meant to create a 
lawless no-man’s-land on the Internet.”
51
  Therefore, the court remanded the case to determine 
whether the alleged violations actually occurred.
52
   
CDA immunity, however, was extended by the court to website operators “providing 
neutral tools to carry out what may be unlawful or illicit searches.”
53
  Although the original 
questionnaire might violate federal and state law, the additional tools provided within the website 
                                                 
48
 Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
49








 Id. at 1169. 
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to access unlawful information would be protected.  In other words, the neutral conduit made 
available by the service to perform unlawful actions was enough of an arms-length distance from 
the bad conduct to retain immunity.  The court further extended this notion to the website’s 
neutral “Additional Comments” block.
54
  “Roommate does not tell subscribers what kind of 
information they should or must include as ‘Additional Comments,’ and certainly does not 
encourage or enhance any discriminatory content created by users.”
55
  In protecting the website, 
the court noted that “this [was] precisely the kind of situation for which section 230 was 
designed to provide immunity.”
56
 
Judicial grants of CDA immunity for harmful conduct occurring on websites extends well 
beyond simple defamation and into much more serious offenses.  In Doe v. America Online, Inc., 
Petitioner sought to recover damages for emotional injuries suffered by her son, an eleven-year-
old boy, who was lured into engaging in sexual acts with an adult male over the internet.
57
  
Citing multiple violations of state law, Petitioner claimed AOL negligently failed to “exercise 
reasonable care in its operation,” thus breaching its duty to petitioner.
58
  This argument hinged 
on whether the CDA preempted violations of state law.
59
  The Florida Supreme Court narrowed 
the question of preemption to finding “whether imposing common law distributor liability on 
AOL amounts to treating it as a publisher or speaker.  If so, the state claim is preempted.”
60
  To 
answer this question, the court turned to Zeran, reaching the conclusion that the “publication of 
obscene literature or computer pornography [was] analogous to the defamatory publication at 
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 Doe v. America Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010, 1011 (Fla. 2001). 
58
 Id. at 1012. 
59





issue in the Zeran decisions.”
61
  Several pages were devoted to discussing Zeran, primarily 
focused on the combined nature of publisher and distributor.
62
  In the end, the court adopted 
Zeran in-full, finding that AOL fell “squarely within the traditional definition of a publisher and, 
therefore, [was] clearly protected by § 230’s immunity.”
63
  Under this analysis, the CDA also 
provides protection to potentially negligent internet service providers for obscene, illegal conduct 
committed within the pages of their product. 
The western district of Texas reached a similar conclusion in Doe v. MySpace, providing 
internet service providers immunity under the CDA in cases of “gross negligence claims [where] 
the operator knew that sexual predators were using [the] service to communicate with minors and 
did not react appropriately....”
64
  In MySpace, a fourteen-year-old girl was assaulted by a sexual 
predator who originally utilized Defendant’s popular website to solicit the meeting.
65
  MySpace 
filed a motion to dismiss the suit based in-part on CDA immunity.
66
  Petitioner claimed that the 
CDA did not “bar their claims against MySpace because their claims [were] not directed toward 
MySpace in its capacity as a publisher.”
67
  Rather, Petitioner argued that the “suit [was] based on 
MySpace’s negligent failure to take reasonable safety measures to keep young children off of its 
site and not based on MySpace’s editorial acts.”
68
  The court rejected this argument, finding the 
website’s role a publisher vital to Petitioner’s claim.
69
  As a result, the district court found 
MySpace immune from negligence and gross negligence claims under the CDA.
70
  Under this 
                                                 
61
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 Doe v. MySpace, 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 843 (W.D. Tex. 2007). 
65
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66
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 Id. at 850. 
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continued analysis, the CDA provides absolute immunity to internet service providers despite 
their negligent conduct or the heinous acts that occur within their website. 
Not all courts have exercised such broad, unlimited discretion to internet service 
providers.  In Batzel v. Smith, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals attempted to narrow Zeran by 
applying a more robust analysis of the internet service provider’s intent.
71
  In Batzel, a part-time 
website operator published a defamatory email sent by a third party.
72
  The email alleged that a 
woman possessed certain priceless works of art that had been stolen from Jewish individuals by 
members of the Nazi Party during WWII.
73
  The email was sent to the website operator, not in 
his capacity as a website publisher, but in his primary status as Director of Security at a major 
European museum.
74
  The individual who sent the original email later stated that “if he had 
thought his email ‘message would be posted on an international message board [he] never would 
have sent it in the first place.’”
75
   
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals approached Batzel with less deference to § 230(c)(1), 
focusing on the intent of the website operator in light of the distinction between a content 
provider and internet publisher.
76
  In the end, the court remanded the case to determine whether 
the operator “should have reasonably concluded . . . that [the email] was not provided to him for 
possible posting.”
77
  Reaching this reasonable conclusion would transform his status from 
publisher to content provider, thus eliminating any possible CDA immunity.
78
   
                                                 
71
 Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003). 
72
 Id. at 1021. 
73




 Id. at 1022. 
76
 Id. at 1031. 
77





Some members of the court have expressed opposition to such a loose interpretation of 
the CDA; however, they have typically done so through dissenting arguments.  For example, the 
dissent in Batzel took issue with the majority’s decision to focus, not on the defendant’s conduct, 
but on the subjective intent of the original author.
79
  “By shifting its inquiry away from the 
defendant’s conduct, the majority has crafted a rule that encourages the casual spread of harmful 
lies.”
80
  The dissent elaborated by stating: 
The majority rule licenses professional rumormongers and gossip-hounds to 
spread false and hurtful information with impunity.  So long as the defamatory 
information was written by a person who wanted the information to be spread on 
the Internet (in other words, a person with an axe to grind), the rumormonger’s 
injurious conduct is beyond legal redress.
81
       
 
In near-clairvoyant fashion, this dissenting opinion accurately defines that manner in which blog 
site operators currently exploit the CDA.   
Additionally, the dissent in Doe v. America Online, Inc. emphasized the need to 
incorporate the Restatement (Second) of Torts into the CDA rather than treating the Act as a 
trump card.
82
  Doing so supports the notion that “[t]he fatal flaw in Zeran’s logic-and thus, in the 
majority view-is its erroneous conclusion that, under section 577 of the Restatement of Torts 
(Second), distributors are merely an internal category of publishers.”
83
  In carrying this to its 
conclusion, the dissent recognized:  
[The] statement that an ISP shall not be treated as a ‘publisher or speaker’ of 
third-party information has been interpreted to mean not only that an ISP can 
never be subject to liability for negligence as a ‘publisher’ of third-party 
information appearing on its service, but also that an ISP can never be subject to 
liability based upon its own patently irresponsible role as a distributor . . . .
84
   
 
                                                 
79




 Id.  
82




 Id. at 1024. 
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Such an end result, “flies in the face of the very purpose of the Communications Decency Act 
[which had] at least one goal of . . . [promoting] ‘decency’ on the internet.’”
85
         
At least one court has entirely rejected Zeran’s analysis of the CDA.  Its existence, 
however, was very short lived.  In the appellate case of Barrett v. Rosenthal, two physicians 
originally brought suit against Rosenthal for defamatory comments posted on a website.
86
  
Appellants were nationally renowned consumer advocates that each maintained websites 
exposing “health frauds and quackery” in order to “combat[] the promotion and use of 
‘alternative’ or ‘nonstandard’ healthcare practices and products.”
87
  On the other side of the 
issue, Rosenthal served as Director of the Humantics Foundation for Women and participated in 
two Usenet “newsgroups” focusing on promotion of such “alternative medicine.”
88
  In between 
July and October of 2000, Rosenthal posted several defamatory messages concerning both 
appellants.  In one specific allegation occurring in August of 2000, Rosenthall received an e-mail 
from a third-party alleging various acts of professional misconduct committed by one of the 
appellants.
89
  She distributed this email to both newsgroups.
90
  Shortly thereafter, Appellant 
informed Rosenthal that the statements were false and defamatory and requested they be 
withdrawn.
91
  She refused, and suit immediately followed.
92
  Rosenthal filed a motion to strike 
the complaint, claiming her right to public participation and free speech.
93
  Despite the lower 




 Barrett v. Rosenthal, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 416, 420 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
87
 Id. at 419. 
88
 Id.  
89








 Id. at 421. 
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court’s conclusion that the statements were false and defamatory, it granted Rosenthal’s motion 
to strike partially due to her protection under the CDA.
94
   
The appellate court reversed the lower court’s decision through an alternate application of 
Zeran, finding that “the [CDA] cannot be deemed to abrogate the common law principle that one 
who republishes defamatory matter originated by a third person is subject to liability if he or she 
knows or has reason to know of its defamatory character.”
95
  The court rejected Zeran’s union of 
publishers and distributors within the CDA, finding this broad approach to immunity to be 
impermissible.
96
  “The view of most scholars who have addressed the issue is Zeran’s analysis of 
section 230 is flawed, in that the court ascribed to Congress an intent to create a far broader 
immunity than that body actually had in mind or is necessary to achieve its purposes.”
97
  Because 
the CDA did not impose a barrier to distributor liability, the appellate court concluded that 
Rosenthal was not immune from her defamatory actions.
98
  
The Supreme Court of California took a different approach, thereby halting any progress 
made by the court of appeals.  They did so with a heavy hand, however, applying a strict 
interpretation of the CDA. 
We share the concerns of those who have expressed reservations about the Zeran 
court’s broad interpretation of section 230 immunity.  The prospect of blanket 
immunity for those who intentionally redistribute defamatory statements on the 
Internet has disturbing implications.  Nevertheless, by its terms section 230 
exempts Internet intermediaries from defamation liability for republication.  The 
statutory immunity serves to protect online freedom of expression and to 
encourage self-regulation, as Congress intended.  Section 230 has been interpreted 
literally.  It does not prevent Internet service providers or users to be sued as 
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The Supreme Court of California’s resolution to this issue sheds light on the need for a statutory 
change to the Communications Decency Act, especially as it relates to the new world just 
recently discovered in the depths of cyberspace: internet “blogging.” 
 As of April 2007, there were approximately 15.5 million active blogs operating online.
100
    
A weblog, or “blog,” is “an online journal or commentary posted to the Internet and can pertain 
to just about any conceivable topic.”
101
  In 2006, it was estimated that “at least 32 million 
Americans read blogs regularly.”
102
  Undoubtedly, this number has risen exponentially in the 
past three years, as has the overall popularity of blogs.   
One particular area of growth is found in college gossip sites such as Juicy Campus, 
Boredat, and CollegeACB.
103
  Unfortunately for this paper, the Juicy Campus website was 
recently terminated, naming the “economic downturn” responsible for the site’s inability to 
continue down its arguably libelous path.
104
  However, in its heyday, Juicy Campus was “a Web 
site . . . which claim[ed] to have ‘the simple mission of enabling online anonymous free speech 
on college campuses.’”
105
  The site boasted independent gossip sites relating to 500 different 
college campuses across the country.
106
  On the opening page of the website, the title caption 
read: “This is the place to spill the juice about all the crazy stuff going on at your campus.  It’s 
                                                 
100
 With 15.5 Million Active Blogs, New Technorati Data Shows That Blogging Growth Seems to Be 
Peaking:  Posting of Heather Green on Business Week’s Blogspotting, BUSINESSWEEK.COM, Apr. 25, 
2007, http://www.businessweek.com/the_thread/blogspotting/archives/2007/04/blogging_growth.html. 
101
 Jennifer L. Peterson, The Shifting Legal Landscape of Blogging, WIS. LAW., Mar. 2006, at 8, 8. 
102
 Peterson, supra note 101. 
103
 Talk of the Nation: Rumors Fly on Anonymous College Gossip Sites (Nat’l Public Radio broadcast 
Aug. 25, 2008), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=93948235. 
104
 Alison Go, Juicy Campus Will Be Shut Down, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 4, 2009, 
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105
 Sunny Hostin, Online Campus Gossips Won’t Show Their Faces, CNN.COM, Apr. 11, 2008, 
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106
 Juicy Campus, http://www.juicycampus.com/posts/gossips/all-campuses/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2008).  
This website is no longer in operation.  Attempts to access the site lead you directly to CollegeACB.    
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totally anonymous – no registration, login, or email verification required.”
107
  In conducting 
research for this paper, multiple accusations of rape, sexual immorality, and indecent acts 
allegedly committed by college students across the country were found listed within the “latest 
submissions” section on the website’s title page.
108
  “Some recent posts discuss[ed] the breasts of 
a professor, sluttiest girls and sexiest guys on campus.  Some posts even contain[ed] racist, sexist 
and anti-Semitic remarks.”
109
   
Despite the recent demise of Juicy Campus, websites such as CollegeACB continue to 
prosper.
110
  CollegeACB, however, takes great pains to distinguish itself from the likes of Juicy 
Campus, whom they labeled as, “a website that fostered superficial interactions, often derogatory 
and needlessly crude.”
111
  In contrast, ACB boasts “a higher level of discourse—while still 
making room for the occasional gossip post.”
112
  Despite this declaration, the website encourages 
participants to “converse openly, without fear of reprisal or reprimand.”
113
  With this no-holds-
barred approach, it is no wonder that defamatory, unprotected content continues to be a common 
occurrence.  One only requires roughly thirty seconds to encounter such harmful dialogue.    
And yet, under the courts’ current approach to the CDA, such websites are wholly 
protected from liability – a legal phenomenon unapologetically utilized by internet capitalists.  
“Juicy Campus is one of those sites that openly [hid] behind its [CDA] immunity.”
114
  By 
offering absolute immunity for third-party comments posted on the world-wide web, Congress 






 Hostin, supra note 105. 
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has inadvertently provided an avenue for shameless entrepreneurs to exploit the protection 
afforded by the CDA for their own personal wealth at the expense of innocent victims.    
The dissent’s analysis in Batzel accurately depicted the exploitation of CDA immunity by 
creators and operators of blog websites.
115
  As stated, “Congress decided not to immunize those 
who actively select defamatory or offensive information for distribution on the Internet.  
Congress thereby ensured that users and providers of interactive computer services would have 
an incentive not to spread harmful gossip and lies intentionally.”
116
  Nonetheless, court 
interpretations of the CDA have created an environment in stark contrast to Congress’s intent. 
Courts have generally recognized that Congress intended the CDA to accomplish two 
primary goals: 1) “to maintain the robust nature of Internet communication” and 2) “to keep 
government interference in the medium to a minimum” by encouraging self-regulation of 
internet service providers.
117
  Analyzing these purposes in light of the emersion of gossip blog 
sites yield the conclusion that neither intention is met through the current CDA interpretation. 
First, providing CDA immunity to defamatory blog sites does not encourage the robust 
nature of internet growth as originally intended by Congress.  It is important to remember that 
the CDA was originally created for the purpose supporting “efforts to protect children and the 
public from even questionably harmful and illegal materials. . . .”
118
  The court’s current 
approach to the CDA produces an opposite result, providing “a foundation for far-ranging forms 
of illegal conduct (possibly harmful to society in far different ways) which ISPs can, very 
profitably and with total immunity, knowingly allow their customers to operate through their 
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  If anything, such defamatory sites devolve the integrity of the internet and 
leads to a decline in positive growth.           
  It is also important to note the drastic evolution the internet has experienced since the 
unmodified creation of the CDA.  In December of 1997, approximately 70 million people 
utilized internet services across the globe, representing 1.7 percent of the world’s population.
120
  
As of June 2008, internet usage has increased to nearly 1.5 billion – over twenty times the 
number of active participants.
121
  No longer are we orbiting the earth in cyberspace; we are 
voyaging beyond the limits of our solar system.  Therefore, promoting robust growth of an 
emerging technology is no longer necessary.   
Second, the current state of the CDA does not promote self-regulation of internet service 
providers; it encourages the opposite.  The purpose of the CDA, among other things, was to 
minimize government’s role in the internet’s development by promoting self-regulation of 
internet services.  Section 230(c)(2) specifically focuses on immunity deserved to providers who 
voluntarily act “in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or 
user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise 
objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.”
122
  A strict 
interpretation of this statute identifies an intent to guard internet service providers from suit for 
proactive steps taken to protect young viewers from offensive material.  The current 
interpretation of the CDA reverses this objective.  As seen in the myriad of cases cited above, 
ISPs are provided blanket immunity regardless of their conduct.  Therefore, such providers often 
forego the expense of ensuring reasonable regulation of the content on their websites.  Why 
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would they with such broad immunity in their back pocket?  Even an economic novice could 
understand that this would be money wasted.  As a result, the courts’ current approach to the 
CDA fails in this respect as well.   
In addition to congressional intent, the current CDA falls short of reaching certain policy 
objectives stated within the Act.  Section 230(b)(5) provides that one such focus is “to ensure 
vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, 
stalking, and harassment by means of computer.”
123
  Obviously, this aim was completely 
overlooked in the current approach to the CDA.  Several cases cited above specifically include 
injuries sustained as a direct result of obscenity and harassment.  Nonetheless, the CDA offers 
absolute protection from suit for such harmful actions. 
Immunity was further provided by Congress to encourage Americans to “rely[] on 
interactive media for a variety of political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services.”
124
  
However, gossip sites such as Juicy Campus do not meet any of these categories.  Such discourse 
does not contain any political, educational, or cultural value.  At best, reading such material 
provides entertainment to the basest of citizens, representing yet another example of how the 
internet has devolved at the hands of the current CDA.   
Although creators of such sites identify an overarching mission of promoting free speech, 
it is clear that their true intentions lie elsewhere.  The very name “Juicy Campus” conjures 
images of young students gathering around the water fountain to present their latest tid-bits of 
gossip – undoubtedly the label intended by its creator.  Although some may consider such sites 
entertainment, there is nothing entertaining about hurtful defamation.  Ask the victims. 
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Granted, there are hindrances to tightening the reins around the CDA.  Critics of such 
restriction would likely cite the difficulty of monitoring websites that receive thousands of posts 
each day.  It would seem impossible to accomplish this without overly and unconstitutionally 
restricting speech.  This mirrors another criticism inherent with this approach: the possible 
chilling effect that would likely come with heavy government oversight.  Indeed, it should not be 
the goal of “Big Brother” to restrict society’s right to free speech.   
Response to both issues may be found in the statutory language of the CDA itself, which 
provided immunity for proactive ISP’s that overly restricted speech on their websites.
125
  One 
could argue that Congress originally intended protection for exactly that reason despite the 
contrary effect that has been created by many courts.  A stricter approach to the CDA does not 
result in absolute oppression; it merely identifies the severe inconsistencies imbedded within the 
current law and advocates positive change in light of the victimization facing thousands of 
innocent individuals across the globe. 
The world has drastically changed since our first explorations into cyberspace.  We are 
light-years beyond where we were thirteen years ago with the advent of the Communications 
Decency Act.  Evolution in technology demands like developments in the law in order to 
positively expand our society’s horizon.  Now is the time for Congress to get on board and join 
the twenty-first century. 
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